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Abstract
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty for juveniles 
unconstitutional.  It relied on three reasons, one of which concerns this article, namely the theory 
that juveniles are less culpable and deterrable than adults.  The Court relied on the American 
Medical Association’s amicus brief which purported to show scientifically that juveniles had less 
developed brains than adults.  The Court characterized juveniles as being risk-lovers who highly 
preferred the present over the future, who loved gains no matter how risky but did not care for 
losses, and who could not engage in proper cost-benefit analysis, because they underestimated 
the odds of being caught and convicted.  For these three reasons, the Court held that they were 
not only less deterrable, but that they were also not as culpable as adults.  This paper takes issue 
with this logic, especially the idea that juveniles cannot be deterred.  If indeed juveniles are risk-
lovers who cannot engage in cost-benefit analysis, because they prefer the present and 
misperceive the odds of being caught and punished, then the proper response is to increase the 
penalties that juveniles face.  Using law and economics methodology, I use a simple numerical 
example to illustrate that juveniles can be deterred no matter how abnormal their preferences are.  
The deterrence, however, comes at a penalty much higher than what would be required to deter a 
normal risk-averse individual.  Another way to think of juveniles is as demanders of crime who 
have a very inelastic demand for crime.  Thinking of punishment as the price of crime 
necessitates a very high price to deter juveniles, a price much higher than what adults should 
face.  The Supreme Court, by abolishing the death penalty for juveniles, deprived the States of a 
valuable tool that they could use to combat juvenile violence.  In this paper I also introduce 
empirical evidence from a series of econometric studies that show that juveniles indeed can be 
deterred by punishment and to the same degree as adults.  Given that juveniles can be deterred, it 
follows that if adults can be deterred by the death penalty, than so can juveniles.  A plethora of 
econometric studies have emerged showing that the death penalty does reduce homicides and 
saves lives.  The evidence of juveniles’ responsiveness to punishment belies the medical claims 
advanced by opponents of their execution.  Furthermore, I argue that the only criteria for 
culpability is the ability to tell right from wrong, something that even the opponents of juvenile 
executions conceded juveniles have.  I also show that many violent adult criminals suffer from 
the medical characterizations that typify Roper’s juveniles.  Hence to rely on medical evidence to 
decide who should be spared from the death penalty is an absurd proposition, and medical 
characterizations should be reserved for what medicine does best, namely treatment.  
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Introduction
In Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the 
death penalty for juveniles, a decision that has proven controversial.1  The controversy stems 
mostly from its reliance on foreign law, and from its unprincipled methodology in arriving at the 
conclusion that a national consensus had developed against juvenile executions.  An additional 
source of controversy, and the subject of this article, is the claim by the Court that juveniles lack 
the mental capacity to be deterred, and hence capital punishment is ineffective.  In this article, I 
will argue that were this claim true, the logical implication would be precisely the opposite of the 
Court’s holding.  My critique will utilize a law and economics approach in evaluating the 
implications of the majority’s opinion.
In Roper, a 17-year-old Missouri teenager decided that he would kill someone, and even 
bragged about it since he believed (incorrectly at the time) that he would not face the death 
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 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).  For reaction to the decision, see James Carlson, Victim’s Sister Tries 
to Live on: She Feels Court Thwarted Justice in Banning Execution of Juveniles, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, July 24, 
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3penalty because of his age.2  Christopher Simmons elaborately schemed with two of his friends 
to commit murder.  He and one of his friends ultimately entered a house at night where a woman 
was alone.3  They bound her and took her to a remote area where she was then murdered.  
Simmons was caught, convicted, and sentenced to die.4  He appealed unsuccessfully,5 but when 
he brought a state habeus corpus petition his luck turned for the better.6  The Missouri Supreme 
Court commuted his death sentence to life in prison holding that executing juveniles was 
unconstitutional under the Federal constitution.7  Despite an earlier United States Supreme Court 
ruling permitting the execution of 16 and 17 year olds,8 the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned 
that a national consensus had formed against executing juveniles.  Taking their cue from a more 
recent United States Supreme Court case which prohibited executing the mentally retarded (also 
on the basis of a national consensus)9 the Missouri Supreme Court believed that the Supreme 
Court would prohibit executing those under the age of 18.  The United States Supreme Court 
indeed affirmed this ruling and in the process, prohibited the execution of juveniles nationally.10
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority consisting of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and 
Souter.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist wrote a joint dissent, while Justice O’Connor 
dissented separately.
2 Id.at 1187
3 Id. at 1187-88.
4 Id. at 1188-89
5
 State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1997).
6
 State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
7 Id.
8
 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).  The United States Supreme Court had earlier ruled that mitigating 
evidence should be allowed to be introduced as evidence in favor of an accused murderer who was 16 at the time of 
the murder.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).  In Application of Gault, the Supreme Court held that 
juveniles had the same rights as adults such as the right to counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.  387 U.S. 1 (1967).  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the execution 
of 15 year olds was declared unconstitutional.  487 U.S. 815 (1988).  For a discussion of the earlier cases and 
juveniles justice in general, see Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice System’s Responses to Youth Violence, 
24 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1998).
9
 Atkins v. Virigina, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
10 Roper, 125 S. Ct. 1183.
4In striking down the death penalty for juveniles, Justice Kennedy relied on three grounds.  
The first was that a national consensus had formed against juvenile executions.11  The second 
was that juveniles have diminished culpability and maturity rendering them less blameworthy 
and less deterrable than adults.12  The third was the growing international consensus against 
executing juveniles; a consensus that the majority claimed was not dispositive for the outcome 
but persuasive.13  It is the second ground that concerns this paper.  Numerous scholars will no 
doubt address the first and the third grounds in the years to come.14
This article looks at the idea of juvenile culpability and maturity, and whether a 
diminution of rational decision-making can logically imply a lesser sentence than that which an 
adult could receive.  Diminished reasoning, impulsiveness, and recklessness that characterizes 
juveniles, the Supreme Court claimed, means that youth are less blameworthy but also 
undeterrable.  If anything, these characteristics, I argue, should lead to the opposite conclusion.  
If youth cannot be reasoned with, then rather than rewarding them with a diminished 
punishment, the optimal thing to do is to raise the penalty above what someone who can be 
reasoned with would need to be deterred.  A wise person needs only common sense to refrain 
from committing crime.  No or little punishment is needed to keep such an individual from 
harming others.  A wild animal, on the other hand, can wreak havoc on its surroundings unless it 
is contained, if necessary, by force.  No one would suggest that a wild bear or cat that viciously 
11 Id. at 1192-94.
12 Id. at 1194-98
13 Id. at 1198-1200.
14 See e.g. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POLICY REV. 33 (2005); Eugene 
Kontorovich, Disrespecting the 'Opinions of Mankind': International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN 
BAG 261 (2005).  A few articles have already been posted on the working paper repositories.  See e.g. Steven G. 
Calabresi & Stephanie D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of 
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=700176;  Thomas G. Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment 
Mess, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=703103; Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law 
and the U.S. Constitution, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771124; Ernesto J. 
Sanchez, A Case against Judicial Internationalism, available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/583.
5attacks a human should not be dealt with harshly simply because animals have less capacity to 
reason and cannot be deterred.  If anything, less ability to reason suggests that the punishment 
should be escalated.  
Juvenile crime rates are unacceptably high, and yet the severity of punishments for 
juveniles has been diminishing.15  Figure 1 shows the crime rates for all individuals and juveniles 
broken down by various age groups.  While these numbers dropped over the last decade, the rate 
for young Americans is still higher than the overall crime rate.  Adults are being punished more 
harshly every day, sometimes with draconian sentences, while juveniles get away with murder.  
The seriousness and heinousness of their crimes has been getting worse over time.  Michael 
Johnson will soon walk free only seven years after he fatally shot four schoolmates and a teacher 
as a thirteen year old, along with an eleven year old accomplice.16  The two had taken part in 
what became known as the Columbine Copycat attacks, named after the two juveniles who 
massacred their classmates and teachers in Columbine Colorado.17  Lionel Tate, the twelve year 
old who killed a six year old and received life in prison only to have the sentence overturned on 
appeal, just recently decided to order pizza and rob the delivery man by pointing a gun at him.18
A fourteen year old boy was recently arrested for allegedly raping a thirteen year old girl in their 
school bathroom.19  Two teenagers are dead, because a sixteen year old decided to fire a pistol in 
the air outside a house where he was attending a party prompting another teenager in a Cadillac 
15
 Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156, 1181 (1998).
16
 Melissa Nelson, CONCERN Townspeople Say it is too Soon; Boy who Killed will be Free at 21, THE ADVERTISER, 
August 12, 2005.
17
 David Washburn, Experts Say Copycat Shooting Just a Matter of When, Where, SAN DIEGO UN.-TRIB., March 23, 
2001, at A20.
18
 John-Thor Dahlburg, Young Killer Arrested in Pizza Holdup; Lionel Tate, whose Life Sentence as a Juvenile was 
Overturned, might Face that Term Again, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at A13.
19
 Steve Rubenstein, Boy, 14,Hheld after Girl, 13, Reports Rape, SAN FRAN. CHRONICLE, May 19, 2005, at B4.
6to fire into the crowd of partygoers.20  A sixteen year old girl unhappy with her father’s strict 
discipline hired her seventeen year old boyfriend to fatally stab him.21  The stories are endless 
and the crimes are heinous.  The States, therefore, need the maximum flexibility to design their 
criminal codes to combat juvenile crime.
 [Insert figure 1 here]
The outline of this article is as follows.  Section I will discuss the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of juvenile’s diminished culpability and maturity.  Section II will then translate the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of juveniles into economic terms, and then will demonstrate 
the logical flaw of the Supreme Court’s analysis.  Section III will canvass the economics 
literature as it relates to juvenile rationality and responsiveness to incentives both positive and 
negative with a specific emphasis on whether juveniles can be deterred against committing 
crimes.  Section IV will suggest some thoughts on what the optimal punishment for juveniles 
should be, while Section V will take a brief look at how our society has changed its perception of 
juveniles and their responsibilities.  The final section will offer some concluding thoughts.
I. Diminished Culpability: Roper’s Juveniles
1. The Majority
Juveniles, the Supreme Court tells us, are different from adults in three respects.  The first 
is that juveniles lack the maturity of adults leading them to sometimes engage in ill-considered 
and reckless actions and decisions.22  The second difference is that “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” 
20
 Kathy Jefcoats, Drive-by Shooting Leaves more Tragedy in its Wake, ATLANTA JOUR.-CONST., April 30, 2005, at 
1E.
21
 Andrew Tilghman, Suspect will be Tried as an Adult; She is Accused of Hiring Boyfriend to kill her Father when 
she was 16, HOUST. CHRONICLE, February 12, 2005, at B5.
22 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195 (citations omitted).
7as they have “less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”23  The 
third distinction is that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult” as 
the “personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”24  These differences, the 
Supreme Court concluded, meant that the conduct of juveniles was “not as morally reprehensible 
as that of an adult.”25  How could they be held to the same standards as adults when they are so 
vulnerable and lack control over their immediate surroundings, the Supreme Court argued.26
Since juveniles are still struggling to define their character at that stage of their life, even heinous 
crimes committed by juveniles do not indicate a depravity of character as it might if an adult had 
committed a similar crime.27  This diminished culpability of juveniles therefore meant that the 
“penological justifications” that undergird the death penalty do not apply to juveniles.  The two 
distinct justifications for the death penalty, according to prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, are 
retribution and deterrence, both of which could not apply to juveniles due to their diminished 
culpability.28
The Supreme Court then stated that diminished culpability meant that society was not 
justified in imposing the most extreme sanction on juveniles, as “[r]etribution is not proportional 
if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”29  As to the issue of 
deterrence, the Supreme Court asserted that there was no evidence that “the death penalty has a 
significant or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles.”30  The Court reasoned that the same 
factors that made juveniles less culpable also meant that juveniles were “less susceptible to 
23 Id. at 1195.
24 Id.
25 Id. (citations omitted).
26 Id.
27 Id
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
30 Id.
8deterrence.”31  The Court quoted the plurality from an earlier case,32 that had outlawed the 
execution of those 15 years old and under, which observed that “[t]he likelihood that the teenage 
offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of 
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”  
The Court conceded that “[t]o the extent the juvenile death penalty might have residual 
deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.”33  It also 
admitted that many brutal crimes may be committed by juveniles, and that many juveniles may 
have sufficient maturity as adults.34  The Court rejected, however, the suggestion that juries 
should be allowed to distinguish between those juvenile offenders who suffer from a lack of 
maturity and those who are mature and depraved  by noting that even expert psychologists find it 
difficult to differentiate between these two groups.35  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
death penalty for juveniles under 18 years of age would be unconstitutional.
2. Dueling Briefs and O’Connor’s Dissent
No doubt the majority derived some of its certitude regarding juveniles’ characteristics 
from the respondent’s brief (Mr. Simmons), but many of their assertions are contained in the 
amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association (AMA), as well as another brief filed by 
the American Psychological Association (APA).  Justice O’Connor’s dissent, the petitioner’s 
reply brief, as well the amicus brief for the State of Alabama attempted to rebut the claims made 
by the majority, Mr. Simmons, the AMA, and the APA.  Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which 
amplified the rebuttals made by the petitioner and the State of Alabama, took issue with the 
31 Id.
32 Thomson, 487 US at 387. 
33 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
34 Id. at 1196-97.
35 Id. at 1197.
9Court’s analysis of juveniles and whether the differences between them and adults were 
sufficient to justify outlawing the death penalty.  
The AMA’s brief made several assertions.  Adolescents, the brief argued, behave 
differently than adults, because their emotions are more volatile, and their brains are not well 
developed.  The AMA conceded that adolescents have the ability to “distinguish right from 
wrong” and that they do not lack the ability to conduct any cost-benefit analysis.  The problem is 
that they are “risk takers” and they lack the ability to “perceive and weigh risks and benefits 
accurately.”36  They focus on “opportunities for gains” rather than “protection against losses.”37
Furthermore, they focus on “short-term consequences,” and they “discount future consequences 
more than adults.”38  These observations were the results of psychological studies as well as 
biological differences, most notably the differences in brain structure.39  Juveniles rely on 
different brain regions for certain tasks than adults.40  The region that juveniles rely on for 
information processing is the amygdala, a region that is associated with impulses such as anger 
and aggression.  The region of the brain that adults rely on, the frontal cortex, develops much 
later in juveniles.41  The AMA cited groundbreaking evidence from brain imaging studies that 
show “that the brain’s frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into late adolescence.”42
The prefrontal cortex, which is associated with impulse control, risk assessment, and moral 
reasoning is “one of the last brain regions to mature.”43
36 Amicus Brief of American Medical Association available at 2004 WL 1633549, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 10-20 (relying heavily on Elizabeth R. Sowell et. al, Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray matter 
Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships during Postadolescent Brain maturation, 21 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001)).
40 Id. at 11.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 16 (citations omitted).
43 Id.(citations omitted).
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The APA, in its amicus brief, made similar claims.44  Adolescents are risk takers by 
nature, and engage in criminal behavior on a larger scale than adults.45  Juveniles have the 
highest ratio of criminals, as the ratio of criminals in each age group grows steeply until it peaks 
at age 18 and then drops off.46  This statistical observation is true in almost all Western nations.  
The APA also argued that adolescents are less focused on the future and less likely to appreciate 
the true costs and benefits of their actions.47  This again, the APA claimed, was due to biological 
reasons.  The APA further asserted that juveniles were so psychologically complex that it was 
impossible to determine whether a particular criminal juvenile was the immature type whose life 
should be spared or a psychopath who deserved to die.48
The petitioner (the State of Missouri) responded to these briefs by disputing the science 
behind the claims that juveniles were neither culpable nor deterrable.  They pointed out that the 
APA had claimed that juveniles indeed were mature enough to decide whether to have an 
abortion or not without the need for parental supervision.49  Also, relying on competing scientific 
studies, they suggested that there was little difference between juveniles’ cognitive capacities 
and adults’.  As to the risk-taking, the petitioner pointed out that what adults label as risk-taking 
may be acceptable behavior for juveniles in order to gain experience and learning.50  Similarly, 
conduct that juveniles rationally engage in may be regarded as irrational for adults.  The 
petitioner also rebutted the claims of biological differences between adults and juveniles by 
44 Amicus Brief of American Psychological Association available at 2004 WL 1636447.
45 Id. at 5.
46 Id. at 5-6.
47 Id. at 7.
48 Id. at 20.  The respondent’s brief made similar claims as the AMA and the APA, although the Court seems to have 
been influenced by the latter two’s briefs.  Brief for Respondent available at 2004 WL 1947812.
49
 Reply Brief for Petitioner, available at 2004 WL 2046818, at 9 (citing the APA’s amicus brief in Hodgson v. 
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)).
50 Id. at 12 (citing L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCI. & 
BIOBEHAV. REV. 417, 422 (2000)).
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questioning the scientific validity of the studies.  The studies were inconclusive and at best 
speculative, the State of Missouri claimed. 
Justice O’Connor also took aim at the majority’s claims of why the differences between 
juveniles and adults justified a ban on their execution.  The majority did not explain how the fact 
that juveniles were less culpable than adults meant that they were not sufficiently culpable to be 
executed.  Also, the fact that the death penalty may be less likely to deter juveniles than adults 
did not mean that the threat of the death penalty was not an effective threat to prevent some 
juveniles from committing crimes.  She also questioned the validity of comparing juveniles in 
general with adults in general.  Simply because the average youth is less mature than the average 
adult does not mean that the particular juvenile who committed heinous crime is less culpable.  
There may be very mature and calculating youth and very immature and naive adults, Justice 
O’Connor argued.
Justice O’Connor and the petitioner’s strategy was to rebut the scientific foundations and 
assumptions behind the AMA, APA, and majority’s claims.  This paper takes a slightly different 
approach.  Rather than quibble with the claims made by the AMA, APA, and the majority, I will 
(in the first part of this article) show that their claims in fact argue for even more stringent 
penalties than those meted out to adults.  Precisely because adolescents are reckless, immature, 
unable to properly weigh the consequences of their actions, and focus on the present, state 
governments should be allowed to use the ultimate sanction.  In fact, state governments should 
have the flexibility to devise other punishments that would not ordinarily be administered to 
adults such as corporal punishment.  Later in this article, I will question some of the scientific 
claims by looking at economic studies that have studied the question of juvenile behavior.
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II. The Economic Implications of Roper
The majority (the AMA, and the APA) made three claims regarding juveniles.  While not 
questioning their rationality or ability to engage in cost-benefit analysis per se, they argued that 
juveniles are incapable of making correct decisions.  This is because of the first claim: they are 
risk lovers.  They also, the second claim goes, discount the future by focusing on “opportunities 
for gains” rather than “protection against losses,” they focus on “short-term consequences,” and 
they “discount future consequences more than adults.”  Finally, they fail to “perceive and weigh 
risks and benefits accurately.”
When viewed from a law and economics lens, these claims imply behavioral 
consequences for which an economist could generate policy implications.  The policy 
implications of the three claims regarding juveniles would actually be the opposite of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.  If juveniles indeed have these characteristics, then they should be 
punished more severely than adults.51  Juveniles, to use the language of economics, have an 
inelastic demand for criminal activity, and the price of their crimes, namely the punishment 
associated with it, must be high (and as immediate) as possible.  In this section, I shall deal with 
each of the three claims, namely, risk-loving, heavy discounting of the future, and incorrect 
perception of probabilities.
1. Reckless Youth
The majority did not advance the claim of irrationality, and in fact, the AMA explicitly 
denied that juveniles were irrational.  The majority and the AMA stressed, however, that 
51
 So far the one law and economics study that seems to agree with the decision in Roper is Michael E. O’Neill, 
Irrationality and the Criminal Sanction, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 139 (2004).  For a view that would probably 
support my views, seeTerrence R. Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI-KENT L. 
REV. 101 (2005).
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juveniles were incapable of correctly assessing the proper costs and benefits of crime due to their 
love for risk.
The Economics Nobel Laureate Gary Becker pioneered the modern rational actor model 
of crime (also known as the law and economics of crime).52  The model, in its simplest form, 
posits that since criminals gain from committing crimes, in order to deter them, the state should 
impose sanction whose expected value exceeds the gains.  To take a simplistic example, suppose 
a criminal gains $100 every time he robs a convenience store.  Suppose also that the probability 
of detection and conviction is 10%, the state should then impose a penalty that is at least $1000 
in magnitude either in the form of a fine or time served in prison for which the opportunity cost 
to the criminal is $1000.  This simple model gives the reader a very basic idea of how an 
economist would approach the question of crime and punishment.
Implicit in the previous example was the assumption that the individual committing the 
crime was risk-neutral.  Risk neutrality means that an individual who is given the choice of a 
gamble or a certain outcome whose value is equal to the expected value of the gamble will be 
indifferent between the two.  For example, if a gamble paid $100 with probability ½ and $0 also 
with probability ½, the expected value of this gamble would be ½ x 100 + ½ x 0=$50.  A risk-
neutral individual would be indifferent between the two choices.  A risk-averse individual, on the 
52
 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).  For more on the 
law and economics approach to crime, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 471 
(2004); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW  502(2003); John DiIulio, Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and 
Public Policy, 10 J ECON. PERSP. 3 (1996); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J 
ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1193 
(1985); Michael K. Block & Robert C. Lind, An Economics Analyis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. 
LEG. STUD. 479 (1975); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).  For a 
comprehensive survey of the literature, see Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 345 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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other hand, would prefer the certain value of $50 to the gamble that pays $50 as an expected 
outcome.  In contrast, a risk-lover prefers the gamble to the certain outcome.53
There has been some debate in the economics literature about whether criminals are risk-
averse or risk-loving.54  Whatever, the case may be, either raising the penalty they face or the 
probability of detection and conviction can deter both a risk-averse or risk-loving individual.  
The penalty can be raised either by increasing the fine, amount of time spent in jail, a 
combination of both, or by imposing the death penalty.  Since most punishments are imposed 
53
 The concept of risk aversion can be derived from a basic economic concept called the diminishing marginal utility 
of income.  One of the basic building blocks of economic models is the utility function.  Each individual is assumed 
to possess a utility function that takes as inputs the consumer’s level of consumption of goods and services and 
generates as an output the level of utility or satisfaction to the consumer.  While fictional, nonetheless the utility 
function serves as a useful tool for understanding economic behavior.  Suppose for example, that an individual had a 
utility function given by U x= , so that the individual received utility equal to the square root of the 
consumption of quantity x of any good.  Hence, if the individual consumed 4 units of apples, she would receive 2 
units of satisfaction, and so on.  This discussion of consumer demand is a simplified form of standard economic 
theory.  The reader can consult any economics textbook for more details.  See e.g. ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 252 (5th ed. 2000); BRIAN BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS 
WITH CALCULUS 315 (1985).  For an advanced discussion, see JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE 
ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION (1992); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, TIME, UNCERTAINTY, AND 
INFORMATION (1989). 
Utility functions are also assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns, which means that the more the 
consumer consumes, the less extra satisfaction she gets from the last unit consumed.  While the consumer receives 
more satisfaction from consuming more units, the marginal increase in satisfaction is decreasing.  Hence if the 
consumer with the utility function given by U x=  ate one apple, she would receive one unit of utility, while if 
she ate four apples, an increase of three apples, she would only receive two units of utility.  Consuming nine apples, 
an extra five apples, only gives her three units of satisfaction, one extra unit of satisfaction.  The increase in 
satisfaction is known as the marginal utility, and so in the previous example, the marginal utility from consuming 
the first unit of apples was one, the marginal utility from consuming the next three units was one, and the marginal 
utility from consuming the next five units was also one.
The idea of deriving utility from consuming goods and services can also be applied to income.  Individuals 
derive utility from their income, because the income can ultimately be used to purchase the goods and services that 
they wish to consume.  The property of diminishing marginal utility can also be applied to income.  An individual 
gains far more satisfaction from making an extra $10,000 in income when her initial income was $10,000 then when 
her initial income was $1 million.  Given that an individual gains less satisfaction from the extra income at higher 
levels of income, the converse is also true, i.e. such an individual will not lose as much satisfaction if they lost 
$10,000 in income when their initial income was $1 million as opposed to when their initial income was $10,000.  
This should suggest to the reader that an individual who is offered the opportunity to participate in lottery that pays 
$10,000 with probability ½, and $0 with probability ½, then this individual is more likely to partake in the lottery if 
his income is $1million than if his income were $10,000.  This simple example can be used to motivate the idea of 
risk aversion.  The lottery represents the risk and uncertainty that faces the consumer.
A risk-loving individual, on the other hand, derives more utility from consumption or income as the units 
consumed increase.  Such an individual’s utility can be represented by a function such as U=x2.
54 See Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on the Differences between Student and 
Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 123 (1995); Jeffery grogger, Certainty vs. 
Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297 (1991).
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many months or years after the crime was committed, this causes criminals to discount the cost 
of their crime.  Hence speeding up their punishment by limiting appeals or by expediting trials 
and appeals for the criminally accused would also raise the penalty as perceived by the 
criminal.55
Gary Becker had speculated that criminals are risk loving.56  In his mathematical model 
of criminal behavior he assumed that when a criminal commits a crime, it would net him income 
Y if he is not caught and income Y-f (where f is the fine) if caught.  The criminal will be caught 
with probability p, and so the expected utility for the criminal is (1 ) ( ) ( )p U Y f pU Y  + , where 
U is the utility function of the criminal.57  If the criminal is risk averse, then the utility function 
will be concave which means that the criminal displays a diminishing marginal utility of income.  
Such a criminal will be deterred more by an increase in the penalty than the increase in 
probability of detection; a 1% increase in penalty will deter more than a 1% increase in 
probability of apprehension and conviction.  The opposite is true if the criminal is risk-loving; a 
1% increase in probability of detection will deter more than a corresponding increase in the 
penalty.  In both cases, though, increasing the penalty will deter the criminal.
To see this, a numerical example can be helpful.  Suppose an individual is risk-averse.  
This individual will have a utility function that could be represented by U x= , where x is the 
55
 Harold J. Brumm and Dale O. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of Punishment and the Commission of Homicides: A 
Covariance Structure Analysis, 31 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 1 (1996); Maynard L. Erickson, Jack P. Gibbs, & 
Gary F. Jensen, The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 305 
(1977).
56
 Becker, supra note 52 at 178. But see William M. Brown & Morgan O. Reynolds, Crime and “Punishment”: Risk 
Implications, 6 J. ECON. THEORY 508 (1973) (taking issue with Becker’s results on the grounds that Becker’s results 
is specific to his mathematical formulation and cannot necessarily be generalized).  See also Raymond Dacey, The 
S-Shaped Utility Function, 135 SYNTHESE 243 (2003) (showing that alternative specification can explain why 
criminals respond more to a change in the probability of detection than the severity of punishment); William S. 
Neilson and Harold Winter, On Criminal’s Risk Attitudes, 55 Econ. Letters 97 (1997) (showing that criminals can 
respond more to a change in the probability of detection than the severity of punishment and still be risk-averse).
57 See note 53 supra for details on utility functions.
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income the individual receives.58  Suppose the individual has an annual income of $10,000.  This 
income does not depend on whether he commits a crime or not.  Now suppose that he could 
commit a crime that will give him actual or psychic income of $1000 per year.  If he is caught 
and convicted, he will pay a fine of f (this could also be thought of as time in jail where he loses 
income equal to f).  The probability of being caught and convicted in this example is 20%.  In 
this case, the individual compares the expected utility of committing the crime (which entails a 
20% chance of being caught and having income 10,000-f or an 80% chance of having an income 
of $11,000) with the certain utility of not committing the crime (and hence having an income of 
$10,000).  This means that the individual will commit the crime if 
0.8 11,000 0.2 10,000 10,000f+  > .  To see the impact of increasing f on the decision 
whether to commit the crime or not, I have plotted the left hand side of the previous expression 
in figure 2.  The dotted line in figure 1 is the utility of no crime or 10,000 .  The reader can see 
that when the fine is less than $3500, a crime will be committed and when the fine rises above 
that, this individual will not carry out any crime.
[Insert figure 2 here]
Now suppose that the individual is risk-loving.  In this case, we can model his utility 
function as 2U x= .59  Suppose that the income levels and probability of detection are also the 
same as in the previous example.  Then this individual will commit the crime if 
58
 To see that this individual is indeed risk-averse, consider two choices that this person could face: a gamble where 
the outcome is either $100 or $0 with equal probabilities or a certain amount of $50, which is equal to expected 
value of the gamble.  The utility of the certain amount is equal to 50U = =7.07.  The expected utility of the 
gamble is 0.5 100 0.5 0 5+ = , and therefore, this individual will prefer the certain amount to the gamble.  This 
is the definition of a risk-averse person.
59
 To see that this individual is indeed risk-loving, consider the two choices that were intrdocued in footnote 58
supra.  The utility of the certain amount is equal to 250 2500U = = .  The expected utility of the gamble is 
2 20.5(100) 0.5(0) 5,000+ = , and therefore, this individual will prefer the gamble to the certain outcome.  This 
is the definition of a risk-loving person.
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2 2 20.8(11,000) 0.2(10,000 ) (10,000)f+  > .  Figure 3 shows that for fines less than $6,000, the 
individual will carry out his crime, while above $6,000 he will desist.  Two things should be 
noted: there exists a penalty that will deter this individual, but the penalty required to deter was 
about 70% higher than what was needed to deter the risk-averse individual.
[Insert figure 3 here]
If juveniles are indeed risk loving, then this means that while the state would be better 
served devoting resources to detection and successful prosecutions, increasing the penalty will 
also deter them.  Moreover, the state will need to increase the penalty by a substantially larger 
amount than it would have to if it wanted to deter risk-averse individuals.  Given the Supreme 
Court’s assumption was that adults are typically more risk-averse than juveniles, the implication 
of their logic is that juvenile penalties should be much higher than those associated with adults.
If juveniles are indeed risk-lovers, the Supreme Court, by removing the ultimate sanction 
from the states’ arsenal of punishments, has unwittingly lowered the deterrence measures 
available to states combating youth crime.  States will now have to devote more resources to 
policing, and prosecutions, thereby diverting resources that could have been used to combat adult 
crime. 
Another way to understand the proposition that even risk-lovers can be deterred is to 
think of crime as a commodity that criminals consume.  Criminals, therefore, will demand crime 
just as they demand any other commodity.60  An apple is demanded because of its good taste and 
its health qualities.  Similarly, criminals demand crime for the real and psychic income that it 
provides.  The price charged for a commodity determines the amount that consumers will 
purchase.  A rise in the price will ensure that less of the good is purchased, and the converse is 
60
 Most criminal economic studies analyzing crime model crime as a product that is supplied by the criminal, but the 
analysis here is equivalent to these other studies.  See e.g. Becker, supra note 52; Ehrlich supra note 52.
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true.  Some commodities have a very strong demand, and its consumers will be not deterred by a 
slight increase in price.  We call the demand for these commodities inelastic.  A 1% increase in 
price will result in less than a 1% decrease in quantity demanded by the consumers.  Examples of 
such commodities include necessary food items, cigarettes (especially for heavy smokers), 
electricity, and gasoline.  These are goods that we all must consume a certain amount of to 
survive and live.  They may also be commodities that are addictive in nature (such as tobacco 
and dugs), and hence the consumer will be willing to pay whatever price to purchase them.  
These inelastically demanded goods, however, will see a drop in the amount demanded as at 
some price level (usually quite high), consumers will begin to cut back on their consumption.
Consider figure 4.  In it, D1 and D2 represent the demand for two goods.  The demand 
curve D1 is inelastic as it is very steep, while D2 is not as steep and represents a more elastic
demand.  At the price of $15, demand curve D1 shows that for this commodity, the quantity 
consumed will be 15, while for demand curve D2, 200 units will be demanded.  When the price 
increases to $90 the units consumed for both demand curves drop to 10.  For D1, there is a one 
third drop in the units consumed, whereas for the same price increase there is a 95% drop in units 
consumed for D2.  Clearly, the commodity whose demand is represented by D2 is more sensitive 
(and hence elastic) to price fluctuations than the commodity represented by D2.
[Insert figure 4 here]
The demand for crime can also be modeled as a commodity.  If in fact juveniles are risk-
lovers who do not estimate the odds of being caught, convicted, and punished properly, and who 
prefer gains to losses, then their demand for crime can be described as highly inelastic.  This 
would imply that the proper price of crime should be set much higher than the price set for adults 
whose demand for crime is more elastic.  
19
At the prevailing punishment severity for juveniles, social scientists and the courts may 
be tempted to say that they are undeterrable, but what may be observed in fact, since juveniles 
are typically not punished as severely as adults, is that their demand for crime is still high.  
Juvenile punishment has been declining in severity over the last two decades, and this may 
explain the growing relative juvenile crime rate.61  Rather than further decreasing the punishment 
for juvenile crimes, the solution is to increase the penalties for youth crime.  The decision in 
Roper clearly has removed that option from policy makers.
2. Lovers of Gains and the Present; Eschewers of Losses and the Future
Another claim was that juveniles discount the future much more heavily than adults, and 
that they have a love for gains and do not care about losses.  These claims also do not defeat the 
case for the juvenile death penalty; rather, they bolster it.  I will discuss the question of 
discounting first and then the question of asymmetric preferences over gains and losses.
The idea of discounting is intuitive.  All things being equal, we would prefer the present 
to the future.  If any individual were offered the choice of one apple today versus one apple 
tomorrow or next years, surely the choice would be the apple today.  But if the choice were one 
apple today versus two apples tomorrow, the answer might be different.  For some quantity of 
apples, an individual will choose to forgo consumption today in favor of waiting for the extra 
consumption tomorrow.62  Suppose an individual chose to accept $1.25 next year instead of $1 
today, then we could infer that this individual placed 25% less value on consumption next year 
than today.  Economists call the 25%, the “discount rate.”  This is the rate by which the 
individual devalues the future as compared to the present. The value of the future today is called 
61
 Levitt, supra note 15.
62
 The idea of discounting is a well known proposition in Economics and Finance.  For a general introduction, see 
ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 101-42 (2000).  See also Shane Fredrick, George F. Loewestein, & Ted 
O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 90 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002).
20
“present value.”  If an individual’s discount rate is very high, then even high amounts in the 
future will be valued much less today.  For example, consider two individuals, one of whom has 
a discount rate of 5% whereas the second has a discount rate of 10%.  Suppose they both are 
faced with the choice of accepting $100 today or $107 next year.  The first individual discounts 
the future at 5%, and hence values $107 next year today at 102$
05.1
107 = , which implies that he 
will prefer to wait over accepting the $100 today.  The present value to this individual of $107 is 
$102.  The second individual, on the other hand, will accept the $100 today, as the present value 
of $107 is 97$
10.1
107 = .  Thus the higher the discount rate, the more impatient the individual is.  
Higher discount rates lead to lower present values and a greater desire for present consumption.  
Just as individuals can discount future gains, they can also discount future losses.  A 
criminal who will face a fine of $100 next year will only compare the present value of the fine 
with the payoff from committing the crime today.  Hence a crime that pays $100 today will 
require a fine of at least $100 x (1+r), where r is the discount rate of the individual.  If r=5%, for 
example, then the fine would have to be equal to at least $105 to make the crime an unattractive 
proposition.  Suppose, however, that the individual’s discount rate was 10%.  In this case, the 
penalty would have to be at least $110.  The higher the discount, i.e. the more impatient the 
individual, the higher the punishment has to be.  In the case of juveniles, their discount rates, the 
Supreme Court and the AMA tells us, are very high.  But as I have demonstrated above, the 
solution is not to lower the punishment, but rather, to raise it.
Recall the argument that juveniles are impulsive and do not consider the cost of 
punishment no matter how high the cost in the future.  Impulsiveness is actually not a criticism 
unique to juveniles.  In fact, psychologists and economists have long observed the idea that 
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people irrationally prefer small present gains to larger future gains.  For example, it has been 
observed that many would prefer $50 today over $100 a year from now, and yet when presented 
with the choice of $50 ten years from now versus $100 in eleven, most prefer the $100 in eleven 
years.  This inconsistency has led many economists to posit that our discount rates are not 
constant; instead, we engage in “hyperbolic discounting.”63  Our discount rates, economists 
argue, are extremely high when we are concerned about the immediate present, whereas our 
discount rates are much lower when the choice is between events in the future.  Hyperbolic 
discounting has been cited as an explanation for why many procrastinate when they should be 
filling out their taxes, quit smoking, or schedule a medical checkup,64 why food-stamp recipients 
eat 10-15 per cent more at the beginning of the month than the end of the month,65 and why 
people may not save enough for retirement as they prefer present consumption over having 
income at retirement.66  Whether hyperbolic discounting explains much of our hastiness,67 what 
the reader should take from this is that any claim that juveniles are impulsive is an argument that 
could be made for all members of society juvenile and adult.  At best what distinguishes adults 
and juveniles might be the level of impatience, a point that Justice O’Connor repeatedly made 
regarding the immaturity of juveniles.  If indeed juveniles are hasty and impulsive, the same is 
true of adults.  Yet, no one would or could claim to excuse adults from any moral culpability if 
they committed a heinous crime.  Pedophiles, for examples, are characterized, according to many 
63
 A comprehensive introduction to the subject of hyperbolic discounting can be found in GEORGE AINSLIE, 
BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001); PICOECONOMICS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1992).
64
 Ted o’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121 (2001).
65
 Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 89 J. PUB. 
ECON. 303 (2005).
66
 Peter Diamond & Botond Koszegi, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement, Is There a Daily Discount 
Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1839 (2003).
67
 For a skeptical view, see Ariel Rubinstein, “Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 
44 INT. ECON. REV. 1207 (2003) (arguing that much of the observed anomalies in behavior cannot be adequately 
explained by hyperbolic discounting).
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psychiatrists, by impulse control disorders,68 and yet no one would claim that they should be less 
morally culpable than regular adults.69  In fact, the United States Supreme Court has upheld civil 
commitments of sexual offenders when their sentences have been served, because of the fear that 
such offenders can easily re-offend.70  Juveniles should therefore be no less culpable simply 
because they are impulsive, and the states should be allowed to set punishments high enough to 
deter them.
If a higher discount rate is what is needed to spare the lives of juvenile murderers, then 
surely adult criminals who have similar discount rates should also be spared.  Adults do not have 
homogenous discount rates, for some of us are savers and some of us are borrowers.  At the 
prevailing market interest rates, some individuals prefer to lend money to the bank, while others 
borrow.  In fact, the variance between personal discount rates can be as high as 30 per cent,71 and 
one study found personal discount rates varied from 17 to 243%.72  One study found that rich 
white educated families had much lower discount rates than poor non-white non-educated 
families.  It would be a curious result if non-educated non-white poor borrowers were spared the 
death penalty for a murder, while a rich white saving individual could be executed for the same 
crime.  But if the logic of Roper were to apply, that would be exactly the type of result we should 
expect.
68
 Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of Pedophilia and Implications for Treatment, 8 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 276 (2002) (citing Dan J. Stein et. Al, Sexual Disorders not Otherwise Specified: 
Compulsive, Addictive or Impuslive, 5 CNS SPECTRUMS: THE INT. J. NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MED. 60 (2000)). 
69
 See stories [add] aei has something.
70
 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
71
 John T. Warner & Saul Pleeter, The Personal Discount Rate: Evidence from Military Downsizing Programs, 91 
AM. ECON. REV. 33 (2001) (finding personal discount rates among members of the military to ranger between zero 
and 30 per cent).
72 Id. at 36 (citing Henry Ruderman, Mark Levine, & James McMahon, Energy-Efficiency Choice in the Purchase of 
Residential Appliances, in ENERGY EFFICIENCY: PERSPECTIVES ON INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR (Willett Kempton & Max 
Neiman eds., 1986).  See also Uri Benzion, Ammon Rapoport, & Joseph Yagil, Discount Rates Inferred from 
Decisions: An Experimental Study, 35 MGMT SCI. 270 (1989); Dermot Gatley, Individual Discount Rates and the 
Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using Durables: Comment, 11 BELL J. ECON. 373 (1980); Jerry A. Hausmann, 
Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using Durables, 10 BELL J. ECON. 33 (1979).
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As to the claim that they prefer gains to losses, the response is similar.  The idea that 
there can be asymmetric preferences over gains and losses is not new to economists.  Two 
psychologists/economists, Kahneman and Tversky pioneered the area of behavioral economics.  
In their seminal paper and subsequent work, they showed that people have asymmetric responses 
to risk depending on whether the risk is beneficial or detrimental.73  For example, many people 
are risk averse when it comes to gains and risk loving when it comes to losses.  The reasoning 
behind this is what is called “loss-aversion.”  Suppose that an individual was offered the choice 
between a lottery that pays $0 or $100 with equal probabilities or a certain sum of $50.  I 
established earlier that a risk-averse individual would prefer the certain sum of $50 to the lottery.  
Now suppose that the individual was faced with the choice of accepting a certain loss of $50 or 
the chance to lose $100 or $0 with equal probabilities.  A rational risk-averse individual should 
take the certain loss of $50.  Many individuals, however, will choose the lottery.  The reasoning 
is as follows: since the individual is so averse to losing, the idea of losing $50 with certainty 
seems quite stressful.  The lottery, on the other hand, does offer a chance to not lose any money 
at all.  Hence, the individual will choose the lottery, so that he can have some chance of avoiding 
the loss altogether.74
Figure 5(a) displays graphically the utility function of a risk-averse individual, while 
figure 5(b) shows a utility function for a risk-lover.  Utility is on the vertical axis, while income 
is on the horizontal axis.  The reader can see that I have chosen $100 as the initial income point.  
73
 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263 (1979); Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUSINESS 251 (1986); Loss Aversion in Riskless 
Choice: A Reference Dependant Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039 (1991); Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).  See also  Daniel Kahneman, Maps of 
Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behaviorla Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Owen D. Jone, 
Time- Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1141 (2001); Haim Levy & Zvi Weiner, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147 (1998).
74
 Robert Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and 
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-40 (1989).
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The utility of $150 of certain income is higher than the expected utility from either $100 or $200.  
Similarly, the utility of $50 with certainty (i.e. a sure loss of $50) is higher than the expected loss 
of $100 or $0 with equal probability.  The risk-lover prefers the lottery in both instances.
[Insert figure 5 here]
Figure 6 shows the utility function of the individual who is risk-averse to gains but risk-
loving over losses.75  The utility function looks like the letter S, and hence is called an S-shaped 
utility function.  The individual prefers to have $150 income rather than take his chances with 
the lottery, but will choose the lottery over losing $50 with certainty.
[Insert figure 6 here]
Were juveniles to have S-shaped utility functions, the analysis would be simple.  Since 
punishment represents a loss and crime gives some gain, an individual who has an S-shaped 
utility function will actually commit less crime than even a normally risk-averse individual.  The 
potential loss from a fine or jail (or death) would scare most people away from committing a 
crime, and the potential gain would not be worth the loss.  An example using previously noted 
parameters would be instructive.76  Suppose the individual has an initial income of $10,000 and 
will gain $1000 from committing a crime.  If he is caught, which will occur with probability 0.2, 
the fine will be f.  Now suppose that for gains above $10,000, this individual’s utility function is 
risk-averse but below the initial income it is risk-loving.  The expected utility can be represented 
by 
000,000,1
)000,10(2.0000,118.0
2fU ×+×= .  In this case, a fine of only $1,000 is needed to deter, 
which is well below the $3,500 that even a risk-averse individual would require to be deterred.
75
 Ellickson supra note 74.   See also Dacey, supra note 56.
76 See text associated with notes 58 supra.
25
Juveniles, however, according to the AMA have a reverse-S-shaped utility curve, since 
they are not loss-averse, but gain loving.  Their utility function would be represented by figure 
7.77
[Insert figure 7 here]
In figure 7, the individual prefers the lottery when a gain is involved, but prefers the 
certain loss to the chance of avoiding it.  Crime is typically random in its payoff.  While the 
average robbery nets a thief only $3000,78 for example, there is always the potential for the 
million dollar heist.  The fact that there is a chance of jail does not seem to matter.  Since the 
juvenile is not loss-averse, the thought of losing does not matter.  An example is instructive.  
Suppose the individual has an initial income of $10,000 and will gain $1000 from committing a 
crime.  If he is caught, which will occur with probability 0.2, the fine will be f.  Now suppose 
that for gains above $10,000, this individual’s utility function is risk loving but below the initial 
income it is risk-averse.  The expected utility can be represented by 
fU ×+×= 000,102.0
000,000,1
)000,11(8.0
2
.  Here the fine would have to be equal to 9800 to keep 
this individual from committing the crime.  This is quite a steep fine compared to earlier results, 
and suggests two things.  First, such an individual is determined to commit a crime unless the 
punishment is steep; and second, the punishment must be steep to deter.  Note, in contrast, that if 
the juvenile possesses a normal S-shaped curve, the fine would only have to be set at $1,000 or 
$3,500 were the juvenile risk-averse.  Even the risk-loving juvenile only required a fine of 
$6,000.  Removing the option to impose steep penalties including the death penalty from the 
states will only result in more juveniles engaging in crime.  Obviously for Mr. Simmons, as he 
77
 The evidence from the experimental economics literature supports this claim.  William T. Harbaugh, Kate Krause, 
& Lise Vesterlund, Risk Attitudes of Children and Adults: Choices Over Small and Large Probability Gains and 
Losses, 5 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 53 (2002).
78
 Warren St. John, Today’s Bank Robber might Look Like a Neighbor, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2004, at A1.
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contemplated his crimes, only death was the proper deterrent, since he thought (incorrectly at the 
time) that juveniles could not be executed.
3. Misperceivers of Probabilities
The last argument for why juveniles cannot be deterred is that juveniles cannot “perceive 
and weigh risks and benefits accurately.”  This is another observation that psychologists and 
economists have made regarding all individuals.  Again, Kahneman and Tversky observed this 
many years ago.  They noticed that people over-estimate small probability events and under-
estimate large probability events.  In the case of a juvenile deciding whether to commit a crime, 
the probability in question is the probability of detection and conviction.  According to the 
research, the probability of detection and conviction for many crimes is small.79  If juveniles 
behaved as Kahneman and Tversky’s adults and over-estimated the probability of detection, then 
this would indeed be nirvana for law enforcement authorities.80  By over-estimating the 
probability of being caught and convicted, the state can deter a juvenile with a smaller fine or jail 
penalty.  On the other hand, if juveniles actually behaved differently from adults in that they 
underestimated small probability events, so that they were even more myopic about the odds of 
escaping with their crimes, then the implication would be that harsher penalties would be needed.  
Consider two risk loving individuals similar to the individual analyzed above.81  The first 
individual is a juvenile who correctly perceives the probability of detection at 20%, while the 
second individual is a juvenile who believes that the probability of detection is only 17.5%.  The 
difference in the perceived odds of detection is small, but the extra penalty needed to deter is 
79
 Ehrlich, supra note 52, (in 1991, the probability of imprisonment for murder was 28.4%, for rape 5.2%, for 
robbery 3.6%, aggravated assault 1.7%, burglary 1%, larceny 0.8%, and for auto theft 0.4%).
80
 William S. Neilson, Probability Transformations in the Study of Behavior Toward Risk, 135 SYNTHESE 171, 184 
(2003) (arguing that even though the probability of being audited for tax evasion is less than 2%, individuals are 
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very high.  The first individual requires a fine of $6,000 to be deterred, while the second 
individual requires a fine of $9,100.  If indeed juveniles consider the odds of detection to be even 
lower than they are, the implications are clear once again: harsher penalties are needed.
In all the scenarios presented above, the implication has always been the same.  In order 
to deter juveniles whose behavioral characteristics are portrayed in Roper, more severe 
punishments are needed.  Now that the death penalty is no longer available to the states, 
juveniles will have less to fear when committing their crimes.
4. Will Higher Penalties Really Deter? A Theoretic Detour
Many skeptics doubt that juveniles can be deterred,82 so much so that some have called 
juvenile criminals “super-predators.”  Many non-econometric studies, particularly those done by 
sociologists, claim to show that punishment does not deter crime.  Their studies usually involve 
juvenile criminals who are either interviewed or followed after their release from prison.  Those 
interviewed claim that they will re-offend regardless of what punishment awaits them, while 
those followed usually re-offend after being released.  This, the skeptics claims, is proof of the 
lack of deterrence.  I will present the econometric evidence to the contrary in the next section, 
but in this sub-section, I wish to focus on the basics of deterrence.
Consider three youth who differ in their level of risk-tolerance.  The first is risk-averse, 
whose utility function is given by xU = , the second individual is risk-loving and has a utility 
function given by 5.1xU = , while the third is also risk-loving but loves risk even more and has 
82
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the utility function 2xU = .  Suppose all individuals have an initial income of $10,000, gain 
$1000 from committing crime, will be caught and convicted with probability 20%, and will face 
a fine f.  The fine needed to deter the first individual is $3,500 (as shown above), for the second 
individual is $4,800, and for the third individual is $6,000 (also shown above).  This shows that 
the more risk-loving the individual, the higher the fine has to be to keep him from crime.  
Suppose now that the maximum fine is $5000.  The first two individuals will not commit any 
crimes, but the third person will.  Now suppose the third person were apprehended and 
convicted.  When he is interviewed or followed after release from prison, unless the maximum 
fine has been raised, he will probably re-offend again.  To say that punishment does not deter is 
false.  It did deter the first and second individual, but not the third.  The solution would be raising 
the penalty.  
Suppose now that the maximum penalty is raised to $5,500.  In this case, the first and 
second individual will still not offend.  The third individual will continue to commit his crime, as 
the fine has not been raised high enough.  This does not evidence the lack of a deterrent effect; 
rather it evidences penalties that are not high enough.83  So far, I have shown in my analysis that 
juveniles need to face high penalties to deter them.  If we, in reality, observe that penalties so far 
have not had that effect, then this is not necessarily evidence of irrationally and undeterrability.  
On the contrary, if anything, this is evidence that society has not set the penalties high enough.  
Whether this is in fact what we observe is the subject of the next section where I will present the 
results of empirical studies regarding juvenile crime and deterrence.
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III. So are Juveniles Rational Criminals? The Empirical Evidence
In this section, I will introduce evidence of juvenile rationality and deterrability.  The 
evidence comes not from the medical or psychological literature but from economic studies.  In 
the first sub-section, I will describe the direct evidence on whether juveniles can be deterred 
from committing crimes, while in the second sub-section, I will look at other evidence regarding 
juvenile rationality and economic decision-making.  I will also look at other groups that have 
been characterized as undeterrable such as psychotics, drug addicts, and the mentally ill.
1. The Direct Evidence
Before investigating whether punishment deters juveniles from committing crimes, I will 
introduce some evidence that children are rational in a very basic way.84  The most basic test of 
rationality among economists is to see if an individual satisfies the assumption of transitivity.  
The basic statement of the assumption of transitivity is as follows: A is preferred over B, B is 
preferred over C, this means that A is preferred over C.  In other words, if an individual is 
presented the option of choosing between commodity A and B, and the individual chooses A, 
when presented with the choice between B and C, and the individual chooses B, then when 
presented with the choice of A and C, the individual should choose A.  Three economists 
Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry investigated whether children were rational using transitivity as a 
measure of rationality.85  They conducted a simple experiment where they asked several groups 
of children and adults to choose between a variety of choices.  They conducted their experiments 
on a group of second graders whose average age was 7 years, sixth graders whose average age 
was 11, and a group of undergraduates whose average age was 21.  They found that in all age 
84
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categories a portion of the group violated the transitivity property, and hence could be classified 
as irrational.  The 7 year olds for the most part did behave rationally; however, there was a 
portion of them who did not.  The 11 year olds and 21 year olds behaved rationally, and the 
proportion of rationality increased.  What was revealing, though, was that while the proportion of 
children who displayed irrational behavior dropped noticeably from the 7 year olds to the 11 year 
olds, there was no noticeable drop in the proportion of irrationality from the 11 year olds to the 
21 years olds.  In other words, children by the age of 11 have fully developed their cognitive 
skills regarding basic orderings.  Furthermore, they found that mathematical ability did not 
explain the ability to be rational proving that rationality was a characteristic developed through 
general experience and not certain mental abilities.  
This study is important, for if we are to take other studies seriously, we must be 
somewhat satisfied that the subjects we are studying are behaving according to one of the most 
basic axioms of economic behavior.  Moving on to the subject at hand, the most direct study of 
juvenile crime was conducted by the economist Steven Levitt.86  In his pathbreaking study, 
Professor Levitt examined the relationship between punishment and crime committed by 
juveniles for the period 1978-1993.  In his study he found that, in fact, juveniles are deterred by 
punishment, and that juvenile deterrence was similar to adult deterrence by punishment.  He 
started his study by observing that during this time period, juvenile crime rates, especially violent 
crime, had been rising at a rate faster than adult crime rates.  He also noted that juvenile 
punishment had fallen in severity by half during this time period, while the severity of adult 
punishment had risen by over 60 per cent.  Using data from across the states, Levitt was able to 
study the relationship between the variation in punishment across states and the rate of juvenile 
crime in those states.
86
 Levitt, supra note 15.
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Levitt looked at the impact of the incarceration rate on the number of crimes committed 
by juveniles.  He found that there was a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
two variables.  He estimated that for each extra delinquent incarcerated, there was a reduction of 
between 0.49 and 0.66 violent crimes.  For property crimes, the reduction was between three and 
four crimes.  The adult custody rate was also negatively associated with the juvenile violent 
crime rate (although it was positively associated with property crimes).  This suggests that since 
adults were being punished quite harshly for violent crime, a juvenile realized a lower return 
from engaging in violent crimes, perhaps since juveniles who commit violent crimes tend to 
continue committing such crimes in their adult life.  If adults are being harshly punished, this 
lowers the return from committing such crimes today.  Property crimes, on the other hand, do not 
seem to have this continuity effect; and hence if adults are being incarcerated longer for property 
crimes, there are more property crime opportunities for juveniles.  
Levitt then examined the impact of punishment on adult crime.  He found that adding one 
more adult prisoner to the adult prisoner population lowered adult violent crime by between 0.12 
and 0.69, and by between 1 and 3 property crimes.  Recall that juveniles reduced their violent 
crimes by between 0.49 and 0.66 and property crimes by between three and four in response to 
one extra juvenile incarcerated.  Punishment, therefore, has a greater (if not equal) deterrence 
impact on juveniles than adults.  This suggests that juveniles have a more elastic demand for 
crime than adults, and also calls into question the underlying assumptions of the Roper decision.
Professor Levitt also investigated another aspect of juvenile crime.  He looked at the 
impact of the relative harshness of adult punishment to juvenile punishment on crimes 
committed by juveniles who have reached the age of majority.  Given that for some states the age 
of majority is 18 while for others it is 17, this statistical investigation provides us with a look at 
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whether juveniles are rational and able to conduct cost-benefit analysis regardless of whether 
they are 17 or 18 years of age.  In fact, he found that as juveniles transitioned into adulthood, no 
matter what the age of majority, crimes committed by the new adults were negatively influenced 
by the relative harshness of adult punishment.  In states where adults were punished far more 
severely than juveniles, when a juvenile reached the age of majority violent and property crimes 
dropped.  In states where a juvenile reaches the age of majority at 17, the new adults committed 
less violent and property crimes than their 17 year old counterparts in those states where the age 
of majority was 18.
These results belie the claim that juveniles are undeterrable and hence less culpable.  It 
also points to the futility of drawing an arbitrary line of 18 years for when an individual can be 
executed.  If anything, they react just as rationally to the incentives of punishment as adults do.  
What is lacking is not the rationality, but punishment as severe as that meted out to adults, for 
most juveniles are punished quite lightly compared to their adult counterparts.  Levitt was able to 
conclude that what explains the relative increase in juvenile crime is the decline in severity of 
punishment.  He estimated that 60 per cent of the increase in juvenile crime could be attributed to 
the drop in juvenile punishment.  The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper will now 
be a further hindrance to states in their efforts to combat juvenile crime.
Other studies seem to confirm Levitt’s results.  For example, Professors Naci Mocan and 
Daniel Rees looked at a sample of 16,478 high school children surveyed in 1995.87  Their study 
had the advantage of looking at individual behavior as opposed to aggregate crime rates as in 
Levitt’s article.  Their dataset contained individual data on youth aged 13-17 from a wide cross 
section of society.  The juveniles were asked a set of questions as to whether they had committed 
87
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certain crimes and how frequently.88  The authors then matched this data with data on the crime 
rate, arrest rates for violent and property crimes (for both adults and youth) in the county of 
residence of the juveniles.89  The crime categories included selling marijuana, assault, robbery, 
and burglary.  The authors found that the arrest rates negatively impacted the probability of 
juveniles selling drugs.  Specifically, they found that one additional arrest for a violent crime 
reduced by 4 per cent the probability of selling drugs by male juveniles.  Male juveniles reduced 
their probability of assault by 6 per cent for each arrest, although robbery and burglary by males 
were not responsive to arrest rates.  On the other hand, female juveniles lowered their theft and 
drug sales in response to violent crime arrests.90  Given that the death penalty is a tool aimed 
primarily at the most violent of crimes, namely murder, the fact that male juveniles committing 
assaults or selling drugs were responsive to arrest rates suggests that a fortiori they would be 
very responsive to the presence of the death penalty as a punishment.
What these studies show is that juveniles do respond to arrest rates and punishment, 
especially for violent crimes, and that they respond (as the Levitt study showed) by at least as 
much to punishment as adults do.  This suggests that if we can establish that the death penalty is 
a deterrent against murders for all members of society, we can extrapolate from this that 
juveniles will be equally deterred from committing homicides.
88
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Studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty have been conducted for many years.  
The first major study was conducted by Thorsten Sellin, a sociologist, who used crude empirical 
methods to arrive at the conclusion that capital punishment did not deter against homicide.91
This idea seems to be acceptable among many,92 despite the number of studies that have now 
shown conclusively that the death penalty does deter against homicides.  The first such study was 
conducted by the economist Isaac Ehrlich who looked at the homicide rate and its relationship to 
a variety of variables in the United States during the time period 1933-1969.93  In his study, he 
found that three variables negatively affected homicide rates in a statistically significant manner.  
They were the probability of arrest, probability of conviction, and the probability of execution in 
that order of importance.  He concluded that each additional execution per year resulted in seven 
or eight fewer homicides each year.  There were several methodological critiques of Ehrlich’s 
study,94 and in response to these, Ehrlich re-did his study using cross-sectional data for the 
various states during one or two time periods only and again found support for his conclusion 
that the death penalty was a deterrent.95  Following this set of work, a flurry of articles followed 
91 THOMAS SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMNET (1967).  For a critique of his methodology, see ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, supra note 52 502-3. 
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Criminality? 13 INT. CRIM. JUST. REV. 110 (2003); James M. Galliher & John F. Galliher, A “Commonsense” 
Theory of Deterrence and the “Ideology” of Science: The New York State Death Penalty Debate, 92 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY 307 (2002); Allan D. Johsnon, The Illusory Death Penalty: Why America’s Death penalty Porcess 
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investigating the deterrence effect of capital punishment; some found a deterrence effect,96 while 
others did not.97  The problem with all these studies, as economist Joanna Shepherd has pointed 
out, is that the data is either aggregated nationally which prevents the researcher from looking at 
cross-state variations or the data is a cross-section of states during one time period which 
prevents the researcher from looking at trends over time.98
To overcome these methodological problems, a new series of articles have emerged 
where the researchers used pooled data: data that varies over time and that also comes from a 
(1977); Isaac Ehrlich & Z. Liu, Sensitivity Analysis of the Deterrence Hypothesis: Let’s Keep the Econ in 
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cross-section of states.  These articles seem to all support the proposition that the death penalty 
deters.  Paul Zimmerman looked at state-level data from 1978 onwards and found that there was 
a deterrence effect, where each execution reduced an average of 14 homicides.99  Naci Mocan 
and Kaj Gittings also found a deterrence effect when they looked at state-level data from 1977-
1997, and they estimated that each execution deterred five homicides.100  Additionally, they 
found that commuting death sentences increased the murder rate.  Joanna Shepherd found that it 
did not matter whether the murder was a crime of passion or a murder by an intimate of another 
(crimes usually claimed to be undeterrable), they also were reduced in the presence of 
executions.101  She estimated that each execution lowered three murders, while the passing of a 
death sentence reduced it by 4.5 murders.  She also found that as the waiting period on death row 
was reduced, murders were deterred: one murder for every 2.75 years reduced before execution.  
This last observation is consistent with the prediction of economic theory that the further away 
the execution, the more criminals will discount the cost of committing a crime and hence commit 
more crimes.  Another study found that 91 per cent of states that suspended the death penalty 
following the United States Supreme Court’s moratorium on execution during the 1972-1976 
period faced an increase in their murder rates, while 70 per cent of the states that re-introduced 
the death penalty after the moratorium saw a drop in the murder rate.102  Using county-level data 
for 3,054 counties during the 1977-1996 period, three researchers found that each execution 
99
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reduced murders by 18, thereby providing the strongest proof of the deterrence effect given the 
highly disaggregated nature of the data used.103
These and other studies concerning the deterrence effect of capital punishment104 and 
punishment in general105 all point to the inescapable conclusion that the death penalty does deter, 
and have led some prominent legal scholars to claim that the death penalty is “morally 
103 Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? 
New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 344 (2003).
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required.”106  What it should also point to, for the purposes of this paper is that the death penalty 
will also deter juveniles.  
2. The Indirect Evidence
The premise of the majority in Roper and the supporting amicus briefs was that juveniles 
could not be deterred since they lack rational thought or if they do possess rational thought (as 
the AMA conceded) their rationality and ability to calculate is clouded by certain myopic and 
euphoric impulses.  Despite the fact that those claims do not necessitate the abolition of the death 
penalty for juveniles and if anything, they call for the opposite conclusion, as I argued earlier, the 
very premise requires some empirical verification.  In this sub-section, I shall present some of 
the empirical evidence regarding the rationality of children, juveniles, and other so-called 
irrational members of society.
One of the best economic studies of youth behavior is the book edited by professor 
Jonathan Gruber titled Risky Behavior among Youths : An Economic Analysis, where a series of 
articles by eminent economists examined various aspects of risky youth behavior.107  What the 
studies found was that even youth respond to economic incentives when engaging in risky 
behavior.  For example, in a study using data for the period 1991-1997 teen smoking was found 
to be very responsive to cigarette prices.108  This result is one of many in a series of studies that 
have shown that even addiction can be economically rational.  
For long, addicts were characterized as undeterrable.  Whether the addiction was to 
alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, it was assumed that those addicted to these substances could not 
lower their consumption.  An implication of this assumption would be that if the price of the 
106
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addictive substance were to increase, the consumption by the addict would not change.  This is 
contrary to normal consumer behavior where an increase in price would lead to a reduction in 
quantity consumed.  Economic studies, however, have shown the contrary: in fact, even addicts 
are rational and they will alter their behavior in response to price changes.109
Even the mentally ill have been found to act rationally.  A study found that those with a 
history of mental illness were more likely to consume alcohol, cigarettes, and cocaine than 
individuals with no mental illness, but they were also found to be price-responsive.110  Even 44 
female psychotics (primarily schizophrenics) in a mental institution were found to act rationally.  
When they were rewarded for the performance of certain tasks they each performed about an 
hours worth of tasks (such as laundry and cooking), but when they were rewarded regardless of 
task performance the patients eventually did not perform at all.111
Returning to smoking juveniles, a study using experimental methodology that looked at 
juvenile smoking behavior also confirmed that price will negatively impact their consumption.112
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Marijuana usage by juveniles was also found to be price sensitive.113  Another study found that 
cocaine addiction by high school seniors also fit the rational addiction model, as the demand for 
cocaine was price sensitive,114 and alcohol consumption by the same group was also found to be 
price sensitive.115
Even non-consumption risky behavior was found to be responsive to incentives.  Teenage 
pregnancies, for example, fell as welfare benefits fell (thereby reducing the payoff for an out-of-
wedlock child), but even non-price variables affected risky teenage behavior, as teenage 
pregnancies declined as the incidence of AIDS grew.116
Another study found that juveniles did respond to legal variables as minimum legal 
drinking ages reduced underage teenage drinking.117 Similarly minimum smoking ages reduced 
underage teenage smoking,118 and mandatory seat belt laws reduced vehicle fatalities among 
youth.119  In contrast, those activities that did not have an age specific legal restriction, such as 
smoking marijuana, did not have an age specific pattern for youth.120
All in all, the econometric evidence points to the proposition that even youth are rational 
who respond to incentives in a consistent and measurable manner, thereby suggesting that 
juveniles can be deterred.
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IV. What does this mean for the Death Penalty and other Forms of Punishment?
Given that capital punishment was the default rule in America since its founding, and 
given that there is a large body of work that suggests the obvious idea that capital punishment 
will deter, it seems curious that the Supreme Court would have removed from the states a 
longstanding tool in their arsenal against juvenile crime.  The burden of proof should rest on the 
shoulders of those who seek to abolish the ability of states to fashion their own policies for 
controlling crime within their boundaries.  Had economists filed an amicus brief in the Roper 
case, one wonders if the result might have been different.  
The policy implications of this paper are clear.  States should be allowed to set penalties 
as high as they feel necessary to deter juveniles from crime.  Combating crime means also means 
that states could also invest in detection and conviction.  Some have suggested that since the 
juvenile penalties are so low as compared to adults, many police officers do not invest in the 
resources needed to combat juvenile crime.121  This is unfortunate.  If low penalties mean less 
policing, then this amplifies the message that it is acceptable for juveniles to commit crimes.  If 
indeed juveniles are risk-takers who underestimate their chances of being caught and who place a 
high emphasis on present gratification, then the states need to treat juveniles with harsher 
modalities of punishment than adults.
A frequent criticism of the justice system today is the delay between the time of the crime 
and the time of punishment.  Even a risk-averse individual with normal discount rates may 
decide to commit a crime if the delay in penalty is large enough.  If juveniles are even hastier 
than adults, a punishment mechanism that allows for immediate punishment must be found.  
There are preventative measures that may help.  Night curfews for youth are one example.  If 
youth are kept off the streets after a certain time, and if they can be punished for violating 
121
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curfew, then curfews will serve two purposes.  The first is that they will lower youth exposure to 
the negative peer pressure that many youth face and that lures them to a life of crime.  The 
second is that by punishing curfew-breakers, it sends a message that society is serious about law 
and order.  It can also teach them that breaking the law is unacceptable.  My proposal would also 
add that the penalty for violating the curfew should be severe.  The severity will send a message 
of our disapproval of young men and women roaming around in search of the illicit.  It will also 
serve as a deterrent.  For if violating a simple curfew will yield a harsh reaction, what could an 
assault or robbery possibly hold? – or so a youth may ask himself.
The types of punishments for youth must also be re-considered.  If indeed they respond to 
present and immediate stimuli more than promised events in the future, then the immediacy of 
punishment is a must.  One proposal is to allow state corporal punishment.122  Youth who are 
arrested under highly suspicious circumstances for violent crimes must have pain inflicted upon 
them.  This will somehow make them appreciate their actions in the recesses of their amygdala 
far from its more thoughtful counterpart the frontal cortex.  After all, the AMA tells us, they 
cannot be reasoned with as adults.  Though their guilt may not be certain at the time of arrest, but 
were they acquitted later on, the state could compensate them for the wrongful punishment.  But 
the message would be clear: we will not tolerate the heinous crimes that they commit.  Sending 
such a message will shape juveniles’ preferences to recognize that committing heinous crimes is 
morally and socially unacceptable, something the skeptics of the deterrent effect of punishment 
for juveniles have argued is one of the few factors that reduces juvenile crime.123
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Professor Kontorovich has called this idea a liability rule of constitutional rights.124  He 
argued that under certain urgent circumstances, the state should be allowed to engage in 
protective measures that may violate certain individual’s rights.  Rather than a property rule that 
enjoins the state from carrying out its protective measures, the rule should be a liability rule 
whereby some compensation is paid out.  Society is protected and those aggrieved are 
compensated.  I would argue for a similar application here.  Mr. Simmons was arrested and he 
confessed after his partners in crime identified him.  His trial, conviction, and sentence was many 
months later.  In the intervening time period, had he been subject to hard labor, caning, or some 
other harsh punishment, the message would be loud and clear.  In the odd event that he was 
acquitted, a measure of compensation could be paid out.  But it would have served its purpose, 
namely the transmission of the message to other juveniles who were contemplating committing a 
heinous crime.  While the state could lose some money from compensation, society would be 
better off due to the reduced crime rate.  
The idea of escalating penalties is not new or novel.  Professor David Dana has argued 
that, especially for regulatory offenses, we should punish first time offenders more severely than 
when the same offender subsequently re-offends.125  The probability of detection for a first-time 
offender is low, but the probability of detection for repeat offenders increases.  Hence, economic 
theory dictates that the first offense should be punished most severely, since that is what is 
needed to deter, while repeat offenders can easily be deterred by lower punishments.  
Similarly, Gary Becker in his analysis of the economics of illegal goods (such as drugs) 
concludes that it may be socially optimal to punish “smaller, younger, and weaker suppliers” 
124
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more heavily than bigger and more efficient producers.  While punishing drug couriers, who are 
usually poor and themselves addicted to drugs, more severely than the organized crime leader 
may indicate the presence of corruption; Becker argues that this may also be a sign of socially 
optimal levels of enforcement.126  This is because targeting the efficient producers does not deter 
much, while targeting the less efficient producers has a greater impact on the overall supply of 
drugs.  Juveniles sense that the odds of detection are lower than what they really are, and hence 
to deter them higher penalties are needed.  This was argued above and is in line with Dana’s 
argument.  The novelty of Becker’s analysis also aids in thinking about juvenile punishment.  If 
juveniles are indeed hapless, helpless, impressionable, and unable to calculate the costs and 
benefits of their crimes, then they are similar to Becker’s small, young, and weak drug suppliers.  
They, therefore, deserve to be punished more severely than their adult counterparts.
Lest the reader forget, my recommendations are premised on juveniles behaving as 
characterized by the majority, the AMA, and the APA in Roper.  The empirical evidence, 
though, seemed to suggest that juveniles may behave as rationally as adults.  If that is in fact 
true, then my drastic solutions are not needed.  All that is needed is the flexibility for the states to 
tailor their policies as they see fit.  
V. Culpability and our Attitude towards Juveniles
So far, I have dealt with the question of deterrence.  The question of culpability was 
premised on the same assumptions that the majority in Roper used to justify the lack of any 
deterrence for juveniles.  The empirical evidence, however, has shown that juveniles can be 
deterred.  This puts into doubt the very assumptions that the majority rested their case for 
126
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diminished culpability for juveniles.  If the factors that were supposed to diminish culpability
also were supposed to diminish deterrability, but deterrence has been demonstrated empirically, 
then the existence of those factors must be questioned as well as the diminished culpability 
conclusion.
Historically, in criminal matters juveniles were treated equally with adults in England, 
although by the 1300s, notions of maturity began to take hold in criminal law.127  By the time of 
Blackstone, the law had broken juveniles into three categories.  Under the age of seven, no child 
was presumed to have any mental capacity to tell right from wrong and hence could be guilty of 
no crime or executed.128  Above the age of fourteen, which was deemed to be the age of puberty, 
all juveniles were presumed to distinguish between right and wrong and could be executed.  
Between seven and ten, if the child was adjudged to have been able to distinguish between good 
and evil, they could be executed.  It should be noted that the emphasis at common law was on 
whether the child could distinguish between right and wrong, and not whether they had an 
impulsive behavior caused by the lack of development.  Children younger than seven were 
excused for the lack of discrimination between right and wrong, and so were the mentally ill (but 
not the mentally retarded).129  Culpability, therefore, always rested on the question of whether 
the individual could distinguish right from wrong.  Effectiveness of punishment is therefore the 
proper tool for analyzing deterrence and not culpability.  The Supreme Court conflated the two 
concepts and essentially mixed what was needed to prove one with what was needed for the 
127
 Sanjeev Anand, Catalyst for Change: The History of Canadian Juvenile Justice Reform, 24 QUEEN’S L.J. 515 
(1999).  Two classic articles that deal with the history of punishments for juveniles are A.W.G. Kean, The History of 
the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364 (1937); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The 
American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV.
613 (1983).
128
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23-25.
129
 Atkins v. Virigina, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
46
other.  The AMA, however, did answer the question of juvenile culpability when it stated that 
juveniles can distinguish between right and wrong.130
Assuming though that ability to engage in proper cost-benefit calculations is the correct 
yardstick for culpability, the Supreme Court has begun to travel down a dangerous path.  The 
Court seems to have been dazzled by the array of medical evidence that the AMA and others 
presented in their amici briefs.  The evidence claimed to show that the brains of juveniles are not 
as developed as adults.  This medical evidence, the AMA claimed, was conclusive in showing 
that juveniles could not properly engage in calculating the costs and benefits of their crimes.  The 
AMA argued that recent imaging studies of juveniles have shown that the “brain’s frontal lobes 
are still structurally immature well into late adolescence.”  Yet, as Ronald Bailey has pointed 
out,131 many adults such as drug addicts132 and violent adult psychopathic criminals also have 
underdeveloped frontal lobes.133  I noted earlier that pedophiles can also have highly impulsive 
behavior, and in fact, they too can be characterized by neurobiological traits.134  Two researchers 
claim that the Zodiac killer who terrorized the citizens of California actually suffered from 
“multiple personality disorder.”135  Men who kill their spouses whom they believe are about to 
leave also have common neurobiological characteristics according to a researcher who claimed, 
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“to establish that evidence has accumulated for a neurobiological link between abandonment and 
homicidal rage.”136  Interestingly, the author did concede that his study “should not be read as an 
attempt to remove the contextual features from intimate rage …,”137 a point also conceded by 
another researcher who studies violent behavior.138  Even gambling, kleptomania, and 
compulsive buying have been blamed by researchers on the chemical composition in the brain.139
Rape has been observed in individuals suffering from brain injuries suggesting a medical aspect 
to “sexually intrusive behavior,”140 and racism, one study found, has roots in the amygdala, that 
region juveniles receive their impulsive anger from, but the study found that such racism could 
be overcome by the individual’s attitude towards race.141  Surely no one would suggest that drug 
addicts, violent thugs, pedophiles, serial killers, jealous husbands who murder their wives, 
gamblers, thieves, compulsive shoppers, and racists should be less culpable for any crimes they 
may commit.
The idea of medical pre-dispositions can also be applied to gender differences.  Simon 
Baron-Cohen argues that men and women have fundamentally different brains.142  Men are 
systematizers who try to identify the laws that govern a system,143 while females are empathizers 
who recognize that others have feelings and who respond by appropriate emotions.144  He cites 
this as evidence for why males may be more aggressive than females, namely the lack of 
empathy.  His claims may be true and validated by other studies (one economic study did find 
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that women were more risk averse than men), but the consequences of his claims if we took the 
logic of Roper would be absurd.  Men would be excused and be less culpable for their violent 
crimes; after all their minds are not empathetic and they take more risks than women.  Women, 
on the other hand, would be condemned severely for their violence.  The battered women 
syndrome defense would be turned upside down on its head!
Curiously none of these medical findings regarding adult criminals have had much 
success as an insanity defense.145  The law has strongly resisted the ever-growing DSM list of 
mental diseases as a basis for acquittals.  Yet, for juveniles, the Supreme Court seemed willing to 
dispense with years of practice on the basis of recently imaged brains that do not lead to any 
consistent or sensible policy implications.
Medical researchers would all agree that environmental factors could be relevant for 
individuals who may have a genetic pre-disposition to contract cancer or diabetes.146  While 
someone may have a family history of diabetes and cancer, thereby increasing the odds of 
contracting one of these two diseases, doctors routinely advises us to use our diet as a 
preventative measure.  Were someone to have diabetic parents, surely the advice would be to 
avoid fats and sugars.  Now consider if such an individual, instead, consumed copious quantities 
of sweets every day and ignored his weight.  We would almost lay blame with the individual if 
he contracted diabetes.  No one would pity such an individual.  The fact that he had a genetic 
predisposition for diabetes means that the imperative to avoid an unhealthy diet is even higher.147
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Recall that the researchers, who claimed to have found medical reasons for violence, also 
conceded that environmental factors contributed to the incidence of violence.148  And just as no 
one would sympathize with the sugar-consuming diabetic, we should not allow the 
medicalization of juvenile behavior to take away the culpability of those who engage in crime.  
The sugar-consuming diabetic should be admonished for being reckless, and so should juveniles 
whose recklessness leads them to murder and other crimes.
The medical profession, like any other profession, seeks to maximize its influence over 
society in order to maximize its returns to its members.  This statement should not be 
controversial, and is consistent with the theory of special interest groups.149  The medical 
profession, in an attempt to gain more importance for itself, has seen medical issues in entirely 
new areas.  Gun control, for example, has been claimed as a subject that doctors see fit to 
comment on.150  It is not surprising, therefore, to see the AMA wade into the question of juvenile 
executions.  In its quest to gain dominion over more American’s lives, the National Institute for 
Mental Health now claims that almost half of Americans are or will become mentally ill.151
Listing such diseases as female sexual disorder and passive-aggressive disorder as mental 
illnesses, it is a wonder that we are all not culpable for our crimes.
It is unfortunate that the majority (and the minority) did not take a skeptical look at the 
amici briefs.  Had economists presented their empirical findings in a brief, the majority would 
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have been forced to ask the hard question of whether the science behind the AMA is even valid 
in the first place.  All that the studies show is that there are some medical patterns associated 
with juveniles’ brains, but no concrete causal relationships have been established.152
The science of mental diagnoses is ephemeral and volatile.  The medical profession has 
also taken contradictory positions over the years.  The DSM manual, that Justice Kennedy relied 
on, once classified homosexuality as a mental disease,153 and it was once believed that 
masturbation caused schizophrenia.154  It is curious how the science justifying including it in a 
medical manual changed so dramatically in a span of few years that it was completely removed 
from the next edition of DSM.  If this is the pace of scientific progress, then what faith can we 
have in the science behind the AMA’s brief?  Is this science the sort of foundation the Supreme 
Court should rest its legal conclusions upon?  These legal conclusions now bind the nation and 
the states and have removed a valuable instrument from law enforcement.  Juvenile executions 
were the norm in this nation for over two centuries, and the Supreme Court should have 
demanded higher levels of proof when condemning the practice.
It is not surprising, however, to see the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roper.  Our society has 
been moving away from the days when children were charged with responsibilities and had few 
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privileges.  Today the opposite holds: they are free to commit crime with small consequences, 
but can have an abortion on demand just as an adult.  At the founding of this nation, it was not 
uncommon for men under twenty to have started their careers.  Consider the following founding 
fathers.  Elbridge Gerry graduated from Harvard at age 18 and then joined his father’s 
business.155  Caleb Strong was nineteen when he graduated from Harvard and started his 
career.156  Roger Sherman was forced by his father’s death to start his career at age twenty.157
William Samuel Johnson earned his B.A. at seventeen and his M.A. at twenty, and was a 
member of the bar at twenty-two.158  Alexander Hamilton enrolled at King’s College (now 
Columbia University) at age sixteen, but left for service in the military in 1776 at the age of 
nineteen.159  Robert Yates was twenty-two when admitted to the bar,160 and John Lansing was 
only twenty-one.161  Jonathan Dayton who was the youngest of the framers of the Constitution, 
was only sixteen when graduated from the College of New Jersey, and was captain in the 
Continental army by the age of nineteen.162  Benjamin Franklin apprenticed with his father at the 
age of ten, only to go on at age twelve and learn the printer’s trade.163  He started as a printer on 
his own at age seventeen and traveled to London where also worked as printer at eighteen.  
While he is remembered today as a man of letters and science, the chronology of his childhood 
should indicate that he never had any formal education; he was self-taught.164  Robert Morris 
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apprenticed in his early teens at a countinghouse,165 while Luther Martin was eighteen when he 
graduated from the College of New Jersey after four years of college and two years of grammar 
school before that.166  Even in England at the time, William Pitt the Younger became Prime 
Minister at age twenty-four,167 the same age George Mason became a judge in Fairfax County, 
Virginia168 and Charles Dickens wrote The Pickwick Papers.169
It was only in the nineteenth century that juveniles began to receive special and lenient 
treatment as members of society and as criminals.170  Slowly over time corporal punishments for 
all disappeared, and the emphasis shifted to reform and rehabilitation especially for youth.  
Somewhere in that process, American society began to lose its focus on accountability.  Our 
children are no longer the shining lights our founding fathers once were.171  We have become a 
nation of victims,172 so claims one author, where we are no longer responsible for our lack of 
professionalism or for our crimes.  We all seem to be victims in need of therapy and self-esteem, 
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with no corresponding increase in accountability, professionalism, or industry.173  It is no 
surprise that the Supreme Court also bought into this culture of victimhood and abolished the 
death penalty for juveniles.  It seems only a matter of time, before it does the same for adults.174
What is needed, therefore, is a return to first principles where only the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong is the criteria by which individuals are culpable.  Medical 
evidence should be used for what medicine is best suited for, namely, treatment.  To use medical 
evidence as a basis for legal decisions is no more legitimate than to use economic evidence, and 
to disturb well settled legal principles should require a far more principled approach than the 
latest MRI images from a laboratory.  
Conclusion
If indeed juveniles are as portrayed in Roper, reckless voracious consumers of the present 
who have little fear of punishment because of their underdeveloped brains, then the answer is 
higher and more severe punishment for juveniles.  The empirical evidence, though, suggests that 
juveniles are just as rational as adults, and this may mean that at best juveniles should be treated 
just like adults, no harsher and no more lenient.  While there may be legitimate reasons for 
abolishing the death penalty for juveniles specifically or even the death penalty in general, the 
reasons given by the Supreme Court in Roper were neither cogent nor convincing.  Hopefully, 
the Supreme Court will re-visit the issue and restore to the states that valuable tool that they need 
to combat the youth and their violent crimes.
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Figure 1: Arrest Rates for Violent Crimes by Age Group
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#data)
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